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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has promulgated the rule that plaintiffs in 
defamation cases who are either public officials or public figures must prove that an 
alleged defamatory statement was made with “actual malice.”1  This means that 
while ordinary defamation plaintiffs need only prove negligence,2 those individuals 
who have achieved public official or public figure status have a higher burden of 
proof; they must show that a defamatory falsehood was made “with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”3 
The Supreme Court has not listed precisely which government employees qualify 
for public “official” status,4 but it has provided some guidance.  First, the 
government employee must occupy a position in which there is such “apparent 
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and 
performance of the person who holds it.”5  Next, that interest must be “beyond the 
general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government 
employees.”6 
There are similarly vague guidelines surrounding the distinction of a public 
figure.  Public figures are those who have achieved “such pervasive fame or 
notoriety” that they become public figures in all circumstances.7  In addition, they 
                                                                
1New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2Id. at 287-88. 
3Id. at 280. 
4Id. at 283, n.23. 
5Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).  
6Id. at 86. 
7Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
170 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:169 
are those who either “voluntarily inject[]” themselves or are “drawn into a particular 
public controversy.”8 
Courts have grappled with the question of which government employees are 
public officials or public figures, often arriving at entirely opposite conclusions.9  
The courts in Ohio are no exception.  In its 1999 decision in East Canton Education 
Ass’n v. McIntosh,10 the Ohio Supreme Court considered the question of whether a 
public high school principal is a public official or public figure for defamation 
purposes.11  Over a strong dissent, and contrary to precedent, it held that a principal 
qualifies as neither.12  This is a surprising result in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s public official/figure guidelines and opposite state decisions elsewhere.   
II.  THE NEW YORK TIMES RULE 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,13 the Supreme Court recognized this country’s 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”14  At the very least, the First Amendment15 guarantees “the opportunity for 
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of 
the people.”16  The Court also recognized, however, that “Society has a pervasive and 
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”17  The law of 
defamation protects this interest.18 
                                                                
8Id. at 351. 
9See infra, note 62. 
10East Canton Educ. Ass’n v. McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1999). 
11Id. at 474. 
12Id. at 475. 
13New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
14Id. at 270. 
15U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “Congess shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .” 
16New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269, quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 
(1931). 
17Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).  See also, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758, n.5 (1985) (Noting that “not all speech is of equal First 
Amendment importance.  This Court on many occasions has recognized that certain kinds of 
speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than others.  Obscene speech 
and ‘fighting words’ long have been accorded no protection.”); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 
342 (1974) (Discussing the “high price [for] victims of defamatory falsehood” who, because 
of the nature of their public status, must surmount substantial barriers before recovering for 
defamation). 
18It is worth noting at the outset that, over the years, certain justices have urged that a 
proper reading of the First Amendment reveals no limit to freedom of criticism of public 
officials.  See, e.g., the concurrences by Justices Black and Goldberg joined by Justice 
Douglas in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296, 298 (1964):  (“We would, I think, 
more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding that at the very least it leaves the 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/16
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It is this tension between First Amendment free speech guarantees and society’s 
concern for protecting individuals from defamatory speech that prompted the 
Supreme Court to establish different standards for recovery of damages for those 
who have been harmed by defamatory speech.19  A person’s right to recover for an 
alleged defamatory falsehood depends upon his or her status.  While private persons 
may enjoy greater protection from public defamation,20 those who achieve a certain 
level of public stature are afforded a lesser degree of protection.21  There are several 
reasons for this distinction.  First, because public officials and public figures have 
“greater access to the channels of effective communication,” they also have, 
therefore, a greater opportunity to rebut false statements, whereas private citizens by 
contrast are “more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is 
correspondingly greater.”22  Second, public officials “must accept certain necessary 
consequences” which result from their involvement in government, one of which is 
“closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case.”23  Likewise, public figures 
“have assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of society,” and as a result, 
“invite attention and comment.”24 
In light of these considerations, the New York Times rule “prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”25  This means that public officials, in order to recover for defamation, must 
prove that a false defamatory statement was made with either knowledge of the 
statement’s falsity, or with “serious doubts as to [its] truth.”26  More specifically, 
“[M]ere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless 
                                                          
people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public affairs with impunity.”  
(Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added); (First Amendment affords “to the citizen and to the 
press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which 
may flow from excesses and abuses.”) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).  See also, Justice Douglas’s 
dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 356 (1974) (“I have stated before my view that 
the First Amendment would bar Congress from passing any libel law.”) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
19See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.  (“This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the 
proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press 
protected by the First Amendment.”) 
20Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (“[I]n defamation suits by private individuals,” states may 
“impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding 
showing than that required by New York Times.”) 
21Id. at 342-44. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
25New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280 (emphasis added). 
26St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
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disregard for the truth.  Rather, the publisher must act with a ‘high degree of 
awareness of . . . probable falsity.’”27 
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,28 the Court extended the application of the New 
York Times rule to “public figures” who are now subject to the same heightened 
burden of proof with which public officials are confronted in defamation cases.29  
Both must prove that a false defamatory statement was made with actual malice in 
order to recover damages for harm to their personal reputation.30 
All of the preceding cases pose the question, Who is considered a public official 
or public figure for purposes of defamation? 
A.  Who is a Public Official? 
Although New York Times  established the rule that a public official must prove 
actual malice in order to recover for a defamatory falsehood, the Court did not define 
who is a “public official,” or even issue rough parameters for determination.31  Two 
terms later, Rosenblatt v. Baer32 provided some guidance:  “[T]he ‘public official’ 
designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or 
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”33  A government employee is a 
public official for defamation purposes where his or her “position in government has 
such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the 
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it,” beyond the interest that 
the public generally has in the performance of all such employees.34 
Rosenblatt v. Baer35 involved an appointed supervisor (Baer) of a county-owned 
skiing and recreation resort in New Hampshire, who reported to the county’s three 
elected commissioners.36  He was replaced after a public controversy developed over 
the perceived under-utilization of the resort.37  Later, a local newspaper columnist, in 
                                                                
27Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). 
28Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
29Id. at 155. 
30Id.  See also, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (“[W]here a 
statement of ‘opinion’ on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false and defamatory 
facts regarding public figures or officials, those individuals must show that such statements 
were made with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of their 
truth.”). 
31New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283, n.23 (“We have no occasion here to determine how far 
down into the lower ranks of government employees the ‘public official’ designation would 
extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or 
would not be included.”). 
32Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
33Id. at 85. 
34Id. at 86. 
35383 U.S. 75 (1966). 
36Id. at 77. 
37Id. at 78. 
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praising the new administrators of the resort, implied mismanagement on Baer’s 
behalf.38  Baer sued, alleging “that the column contained defamatory falsehoods.”39  
The Court did not squarely decide the issue of whether Baer was a public official, 
but it remarked that “he may have held such a position,”40 that a “substantial 
argument” could be made that he was a public official,41 and that the ski resort’s 
management was “a matter of lively public interest.”42  The Court left the ultimate 
determination of the public official issue to the lower courts.43 
In doing so, it elaborated on which positions are deemed “official”:  “The 
employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion 
of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned 
by the particular charges in controversy.”44  This meant that a very low-level 
government employee, such as a night watchman,45 would not be subject to the 
actual malice requirement in an action for defamation just because he might have 
been involved in a matter of public concern.46  In the same respect, since Gertz v. 
Robert Welch,47 private individuals who, like the hypothetical night watchman, are 
not public official, may be able to obtain redress for “defamatory falsehood on a less 
demanding showing than that required by New York Times.”48 
Finally, in Rosenblatt the Court was careful to point out that the fact that a 
particular controversy may be confined to a small locality is “constitutionally 
irrelevant.”49  In rejecting the so-called “small fish in a big pond argument,” 
Rosenblatt only requires that the defamation be “addressed primarily to the interested 
community,”50 however small.  In other words, the public official category includes 
those who would be regarded as big fish solely because of the smallness of the ponds 
in which they operate. 
                                                                
38Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 78. 
39Id. at 77. 
40Id. at 87. 
41Id. 
42Id. at n.14. 
43Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87-88. 
44Id. at 86, n.13. 
45Id. 
46Although, conceivably, he could still be subject to the actual malice standard as a “public 
figure,” as one who has either injected himself into a public controversy or been drawn into a 
matter of public controversy. 
47418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
48Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. 
49Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 83. 
50Id. 
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B.  Who is a Public Figure? 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts51 broadened the application of the New York Times 
actual malice rule to include “public figures” as well as public officials,52 but it 
offered little assistance in ascertaining who qualifies as a public figure.  Later, the 
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch53 described the various means by which one can 
achieve public figure status for defamation purposes.  One way a person may 
become a public figure is if he “achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he 
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts,”54 as is the case for 
celebrities.  
More commonly though, an individual becomes a public figure in either of two 
ways.  The first is where “an individual voluntarily injects himself” into a public 
controversy.55  The other is where an individual “is drawn into a particular public 
controversy.”56  “In either case such [a person assumes] special prominence in the 
resolution of public questions,”57 and “thereby becomes a public figure for a limited 
range of issues.”58 
The “limit” to the range of issues is reached where the person’s public activity 
ends:  “We would not lightly assume that a citizen’s participation in community and 
professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes.”59  In other words, 
“an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life,”60 
but, rather, only for those aspects which relate to his or her “participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”61  Under these vague and 
elastic standards, lower courts, including those in Ohio, have struggled with the issue 
of who is a public official or public figure for defamation purposes.62  
                                                                
51388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
52Id. at 155. 
53Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.  Elmer Gertz, an attorney, represented the family of a victim of a 
shooting by a police officer who was convicted of second degree murder.  His representation 
took place in the subsequent wrongful death action against the officer.  A magazine article, 
discussing the case, falsely portrayed Gertz as a Communist and Gertz sued the magazine for 
defamation.  The Court decided that Gertz was not a public figure under its guidelines 
because, among other things, he took no part in the criminal prosecution, his only participation 
involved the civil representation of a private client, and he never discussed the case with the 
media. 
54Id. at 351. 
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
59Id. at 352. 
60Id. 
61Id. 
62See, e.g., Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Who is “Public Official” for Purposes of 
Defamation Action, 44 A.L.R.5th 193 (1996) (Listing and describing numerous cases and 
courts which have labored over this issue, and cataloging results in which many courts have 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/16
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III. EAST CANTON EDUCATION ASS’N V. MCINTOSH 
In May of 1999, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the case of East Canton 
Education Ass’n v. McIntosh.63  In McIntosh, Justice Douglas, writing for the court, 
held that a public school principal is neither a public official nor a public figure for 
purposes of defamation.64  In dissent, Chief Justice Moyer argued that McIntosh 
qualified as both a public official and a public figure, and as such, should be subject 
to the New York Times actual malice standard.65 
A.
  
Background  
The case involved John R. McIntosh, who was employed by the Osnaburg Local 
School Board of Education as the principal at East Canton High School in Stark 
County.66  Prior to his employment in the Osnaburg school district, he had served 
variously as a teacher, guidance counselor, principal, and assistant principal in the 
Marlington district between 1966 and 1987.67  He was initially hired by Osnaburg in 
1987 as an assistant principal at East Canton High, and served as the high school 
principal during the 1990-1991 and 1994-1995 school years.68 
The dispute arose in February of 1995, when the board of education notified 
McIntosh of its intention not to renew his contract for the 1995-1996 school year and 
offered him the opportunity to resign.69  McIntosh refused, citing his status as a 
tenured teacher entitled to reassignment.70 
When word of the board’s intentions spread, a number of students mobilized to 
protest the decision by wearing ribbons supporting McIntosh, by not attending 
school, and by demonstrating outside the school building.71  Media coverage 
ensued.72  On March 9, 1995, the district’s superintendent, accompanied by police, 
ordered McIntosh to leave the building and placed him on “home assignment.”73  He 
                                                          
reached surprisingly opposite conclusions for identical government employees under the New 
York Times  rule and the Rosenblatt  test). 
63East Canton Educ. Ass’n v. McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1999). 
64Id. at 475. 
65Id. at 479-80.  In addition to Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent, there were two other 
opinions in McIntosh.  Justice Cook wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed 
that a high school principal is not a public official, but disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of Ohio law concerning continuing service contracts.  Justice Lundberg Stratton 
(who joined Justice Moyer’s dissent and Justice Cook’s concurrence) wrote separately to 
address several other issues, one of which was whether the alleged defamatory statements 
were privileged communications. 
66Id. at 469. 
67Id.  
68McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 469. 
69Id. 
70Id. 
71Id. at 469-70.  
72Id. at 469-71. 
73McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 469-71.  
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warned McIntosh that should he return, “appropriate action would be taken against 
him.”74  The superintendent, in a letter dated March 10, 1995, informed McIntosh 
that he would recommend that his contract be terminated or suspended for, among 
other things, “gross inefficiency,” “immorality,” ineffective student discipline, and 
“condoning and/or supporting student unrest.”75 
At the board of education meeting on March 13, 1995, the president of the East 
Canton Education Association (ECEA) teachers union read a statement which was 
prepared by a representative of the Ohio Education Association (OEA).76  In it, she 
chastised McIntosh for blaming his problems on weak teachers in a newspaper 
article, and for his part in creating the “circus-like atmosphere” which existed in the 
school district.77  She also supported the actions of the superintendent on behalf of 
the ECEA.78  At the meeting, the board voted to suspend McIntosh and to not renew 
his contract with the district.79  “Events surrounding McIntosh’s non-renewal 
received considerable media attention.”80 
B.  Procedural History 
McIntosh brought an action against the superintendent, the board of education, 
and its individual members in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on March 
17, 1995.81  In it, he advanced a number of claims, including defamation.82  
“Specifically, McIntosh alleged that the charge of immorality and other statements 
made by [the superintendent] and ratified by the board and its members were false 
and actionable.”83 
On December 22, 1995, the East Canton Education Association sued, seeking a 
declaratory judgment determining either that McIntosh had not attained tenure status 
or, alternatively if he had, that his reinstatement should not come at the expense of 
another ECEA member’s position.84  In response to the ECEA’s claim, McIntosh 
answered with a counterclaim against the ECEA as well as a third-party complaint 
against the president of the ECEA, the Ohio Education Association, and the OEA 
representative who prepared the statement of March 13, 1995, alleging defamation.85 
                                                                
74Id. 
75Id. at 470. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 470. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id.  McIntosh also sought relief on other grounds not relevant to the defamation issue, 
asking for a writ of mandamus, an injunction, monetary damages, and a declaratory judgment 
that he was a tenured teacher who was entitled to continuing service status. 
83McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 471. 
84Id. 
85Id.  
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On August 22, 1996, the trial judge, James S. Gwin, granted summary judgment 
on all claims and counterclaims in favor of the ECEA and the OEA, as well as the 
ECEA’s president and the OEA representative.86  The judge ruled that McIntosh was 
a public figure and that the statement read at the March 13th board of education 
meeting was not defamatory.87  McIntosh appealed, and the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals88 reversed and remanded, holding that “McIntosh was neither a public 
official nor a public figure and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether certain passages contained in the statement read . . . at the March 13, 1995 
board meeting were defamatory.”89   
On remand, Judge John F. Boggins ruled that McIntosh was entitled to 
continuing service status, but granted summary judgment on the defamation claims 
in favor of the board of education and the other defendants.90  Subsequently, the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals91 affirmed on the continuing service issue, but reversed and 
remanded on the defamation issue, deciding that the trial judge had erred in 
dismissing the defamation claims.92  The Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a 
discretionary appeal,93 and considered the McIntosh case against the backdrop of its 
prior decision in Scott v. News-Herald,94 in which the court, citing Justice Brennan’s 
dissent in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich,95 held that a public school superintendent 
is a public official.96 
IV.  IS A PRINCIPAL A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE? 
In his dissent from denial of certiorari in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich,97 
Justice Brennan analyzed the status of public school teachers in light of the New 
York Times rule.98  Brennan reasoned that “the status of a public school teacher as a 
‘public official’ for purposes of applying the New York Times rule follows a fortiori 
from the [Rosenblatt guidelines which help to determine who in the hierarchy of 
                                                                
86Id. 
87Id. 
88Occupied by a panel of judges from the Ninth District Court of Appeals sitting on 
assignment in the Fifth District. 
89McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 471-72. 
90Id. at 472. 
91Occupied by a panel from the Seventh District sitting on assignment in the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals. 
92McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 472. 
93Id. 
94496 N.E.2d 699 (1986). 
95474 U.S. 953 (1985). 
96Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ohio 1986). 
97474 U.S. 953 (1985). 
98Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
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government employees is a public official].”99   He described the public school 
teacher as “unquestionably the central figure in [education],”100 and applying 
Rosenblatt’s guidelines, found it to be “self-evident that ‘the public has an 
independent interest in the qualifications and performance’ of those who teach in the 
public high schools that goes ‘beyond the general public interest in the qualifications 
and performance of all government employees[.]’”101  He concluded, “Public school 
teachers thus fall squarely within the rationale of New York Times and Rosenblatt.”102 
The Supreme Court of Ohio adopted this reasoning in Scott v. News-Herald,103 
holding that a public school superintendent is a public official within the meaning of 
New York Times.104  The court quoted Justice Brennan extensively and 
approvingly,105 and stated that Brennan’s belief “that the public school teacher exerts 
a substantial role in shaping a community through his or her impact on the students” 
was “at the core of [its] decision.”106 
In East Canton Education Ass’n v. McIntosh, the court did an abrupt about 
face.107  Seemingly ignoring its reasoning in Scott, the court decided that a public 
high school principal is not a public official for defamation purposes, in effect 
overlooking its enthusiastic endorsement of Justice Brennan’s Milkovich analysis 
(arguing that teachers are public officials) in Scott.108  In doing so, the court instead 
adopted the reasoning of cases from Illinois and Georgia.109 
In McCutcheon v. Moran,110 an Illinois appellate court held that a principal who 
doubled as a teacher is neither a public official nor a public figure.  In distinguishing 
the case from two previous Illinois decisions which held otherwise,111 the court said, 
                                                                
99Id. at 958. 
100Id. 
101Id. at 959-60 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). 
102Id. at 959-60.  Some courts have followed suit, holding that public school teachers are 
public officials within the meaning of New York Times and Rosenblatt. See, e.g., Kelley v. 
Bonney, 606 A.2d 693 (Conn. 1992); Campbell v. Robinson, 955 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1997).  But see, True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257 (Me. 1986); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32 (Va. 1987) (public school teachers not public officials). 
103496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986). 
104Id. at 704. 
105Id. at 703. 
106Id. at 703-04. (“Accordingly, we overrule Milkovich in its restrictive view of public 
officials and hold a public school superintendent is a public official for purposes of defamation 
law.”  (Overruling Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1984), which held that a 
public school teacher/wrestling coach is not a public official)). 
107McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 474. 
108Id.  
109Id. at 475. 
110425 N.E.2d 1130 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981). 
111Id. at 1132 (distinguishing Basarich v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) 
(Teacher/coaches are public figures), and Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/16
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“The relationship a public school teacher or principal has with the conduct of 
government is far too remote, in our minds, to justify exposing these individuals to a 
qualifiedly privileged assault upon his or her reputation.”112  Blending the public 
official/public figure analysis, and finding that public school principals fall beyond 
the purview of the Gertz guidelines, the Illinois court continued: “‘A private 
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming 
involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention.’”113 
The Georgia Supreme Court arrived at a similar conclusion in Ellerbee v. 
Mills,114 saying, “[p]rincipals, in general are removed from the general conduct of 
government, and are not policymakers at the level intended by the New York Times 
designation of public official.”115  A concurring justice disagreed, concluding that a 
principal is high enough in the Rosenblatt hierarchy of government employees to 
qualify for public official status: “As the school’s chief administrative officer, the 
principal establishes school policy, recommends hiring and firing of teachers and 
staff, implements curriculum and other educational programs, expends and accounts 
for public funds, represents the institution before the public, and is accountable for 
the students’ educational advancement and the faculty’s performance.”116  To hold 
that a principal is not a public official “belittles the role of the public school 
principal.”117  The Georgia majority also found that Mills, the principal, was not a 
public figure under Gertz, but added that principals could, by “inviting attention and 
comment by thrusting themselves into a controversy,” acquire the public figure 
label.118 
Justice Douglas, writing for the Ohio majority in McIntosh, was content to quote 
brief passages from the Illinois and Georgia opinions parenthetically without 
offering any further elaboration on the public official issue.119  He also concluded 
that McIntosh was “not a ‘public figure’ as defined by Gertz,” and quoted the Fifth 
District Appeals Court’s argument that, under Gertz, McIntosh “did not assume a 
role of special prominence in the affairs of society,” nor did he “occupy a position of 
such persuasive power and influence that he can be deemed a public figure for all 
purposes.”120  In a key passage, Justice Douglas also borrowed this quote from the 
lower court: “Nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of the public controversy that 
                                                          
334 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (Junior college professors are public figures within their 
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112McCutcheon, 425 N.E.2d at 1133. 
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115Id. at 540. 
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may have developed concerning his termination . . . [n]or is there any evidence that 
McIntosh sought out the media to trumpet his cause.”121  
However, Chief Justice Moyer, in dissent, found ample evidence in the record 
that McIntosh both thrust himself into the forefront of a very public controversy and 
sought out the media: “[The majority] reaches this conclusion despite the fact that 
McIntosh repeatedly met with members of the press, provided them with comments 
concerning the public debate surrounding his termination, and allowed a reporter and 
photographer access to his home.”122  Further, McIntosh showed his termination 
notice to a reporter and spoke with media members the day after the board of 
education meeting at which the alleged defamation occurred.123  He also insisted that 
board meetings concerning his termination take place in open session.124   
The Moyer dissent found that, as a result, McIntosh clearly fell within the Gertz  
public figure criteria,125 having both “voluntarily inject[ed] himself” and been 
“drawn into a particular public controversy.”126  Under Gertz, he achieved “notoriety 
in the community,” he “thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue,” and “he 
engage[d] the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”127  Chief 
Justice Moyer’s dissent concludes that McIntosh had become a limited public figure, 
subject to the New York Times actual malice burden of proof.128 
As for whether McIntosh was a public official, here too, Chief Justice Moyer 
disagreed with the majority.  Citing the Scott case above, in which the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that a school superintendent is a public official under New York Times, 
the Chief Justice observed: 
I cannot, nor does the majority attempt to, distinguish a school 
superintendent from a high school principal for purposes of determining 
public official status.  Both are school administrators.  Both are 
responsible for implementing the policies adopted by a local school board.  
Both are expected to serve as public role models for students.  Both 
exercise supervisory authority over those who have more direct contact 
with the children of the community.  Many of these individuals assume 
active roles in the life of their greater communities.129 
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127Id. at 352. 
128McIntosh, 709 N.E.2d at 481. 
129Id. at 479. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/16
2000] SCHOOL PRINCIPALS AND NEW YORK TIMES 181 
He added that, under Rosenblatt,130 “principals hold positions which invite public 
scrutiny and discussion concerning them based solely on the basis of the positions 
they hold.”131 
Chief Justice Moyer also cited a number of cases which arrived at conclusions 
opposite to the ones arrived at in the Georgia and Illinois decisions relied upon by 
the majority.  For example, in Palmer v. Bennington School District, Inc.,132 the 
Vermont Supreme Court held that an elementary school principal is a public official 
for purposes of defamation law.133  The court quoted a famous passage from Brown 
v. Board of Education:134 “[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments.”135  Therefore, applying the Rosenblatt public official 
test of whether an individual’s “position in government has such apparent 
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and 
performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the 
qualifications and performance of all government employees,”136 the court 
determined that school principals meet these criteria.137 
A federal judge in Minnesota also concluded that an elementary school principal 
is a public official within Rosenblatt’s  meaning.138  “A contrary holding would stifle 
public debate about important local issues.”139  Finding it unnecessary to reach the 
public figure question, the judge nevertheless stated that if the court were to reach 
that issue, it would find that, under the circumstances of the case,140 the principal in 
question was a public figure.141 
Similarly, in a case not cited by the Chief Justice, a Massachusetts trial court 
found that, under Rosenblatt, a high school principal “occupied a position that 
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invited public scrutiny.  He was a public official for purposes of commentary about 
the manner in which he discharged the duties with which he was charged.”142  The 
court, having reached the public official issue, did not decide the public figure 
question.143 
The dissent also cited a decision by a Maryland appeals court, which held that a 
principal is both a public official and a public figure, and noted that the Supreme 
Court has “engaged or acquiesced in a progressive expansion of the public figure 
category into decreasingly public spheres.”144  Likewise, in a case not mentioned by 
the dissent, a Tennessee appellate court,145 noting that the term “public official” had 
previously been applied in Tennessee to a highway patrol officer146 and a social 
worker,147 held that a principal, as “an authoritative figure and a government 
representative,” whose actions affected Tennessee taxpayers, was a public official.148 
The Chief Justice also noted a decision by Louisiana’s supreme court, which held 
that a school superintendent and a school “supervisor” are both public officials with 
regard to defamation law.149  That court found that school supervisors meet the 
Rosenblatt criteria in that “the public has an independent interest in the qualifications 
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the 
qualifications and performance of all government employees.”150 
In his dissent in McIntosh, Chief Justice Moyer found the reasoning employed by 
these courts more persuasive than that relied upon by the majority.151  He explained, 
“The naming of a public school principal, particularly a high school principal, is an 
event widely published and discussed in many communities,” particularly in towns 
such as “East Canton, where only one high school serves the entire community.”152  
Although he conceded that not all principals would necessarily qualify as public 
officials in all circumstances, he stated his belief that “in most cases they will qualify 
as such.”153  Finally, he predicted that “open, free, and vigorous public debate 
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concerning the operation of public schools” would be stifled as a result of the 
majority’s holding.154 
The essence of New York Times is its “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”155  Unfortunately, as Chief Justice 
Moyer predicts, that debate, at least as far as it concerns the administration of Ohio’s 
public schools, will be more cautious and restrained as a result of McIntosh. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With little explanation, the Supreme Court of Ohio ignored precedent and defied 
the weight of authority as well as a logical reading of New York Times and its 
progeny.  In establishing a rigid rule that a public high school principal is neither a 
public official nor a public figure in a defamation case, the court set a high floor in 
the hierarchy of government employees in whose performance and qualifications the 
public has as independent interest. 
Not long ago, the court enthusiastically adopted an analysis that specifically 
included public school teachers in the public official category.  Yet, in one fell 
swoop, it not only removed teachers from that category, but principals as well. 
Public school principals command considerable attention, particularly high 
school principals who serve in small communities such as East Canton, Ohio, which 
has a population of fewer than two thousand people.156  Even if the majority could 
have reasonably found that McIntosh himself was neither a public official or public 
figure, it unnecessarily imposed an inflexible rule that removes all Ohio principals, 
under virtually any circumstances, from public official status under New York Times. 
Ironically, it was Justice Douglas himself, who, writing separately in Scott v. 
News-Herald,157 agreed that a public school superintendent is a public official and 
added, “[T]he First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech provides us with the 
right to think as we will and to speak as we think.  When we are tempted, in any 
way, to move to restrict these precious rights, it is well to remember the historical 
consequences of the formulation of the First Amendment.”158  He added, “The First 
Amendment gives a special protection to the press from the chilling effect of 
defamation litigation.  This is a protection we must preserve at any and all cost.”159 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments.”160  The public interest in the 
administration of its schools is far greater than it is, for example, in the 
administration of the public ski area that was at issue in Rosenblatt. 
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In the American scheme of public education, high school principals almost 
always fit within Rosenblatt’s parameters for determining who is a public official.  
Their positions are of “such apparent importance” that the public’s “independent 
interest” in their performance is “beyond the general public interest in the 
qualifications and performance of all government employees.”161 
They also usually meet the Gertz standards for determining who is a public 
figure.  As prominent figures in their communities, they often either “voluntarily 
inject[]” themselves or are “drawn into a particular public controversy.”162 
Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent espouses the better view.  It is supported by the 
weight of authority and controlling precedent and reflects a proper reading of New 
York Times.  Eventually, his view will be adopted as Ohio and the rest of the nation 
implement clearer standards for public official/figure status.  When they do, high 
school principals will, as a rule, meet those standards and be subject to the New York 
Times  actual malice requirement in defamation cases. 
ANDREW L. TURSCAK, JR. 
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